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A review of the trend in the judicial interpretation o f ,  and 
judicial attitudes towards tax avoidance in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and South Africa, with reference to the 
''declaratory" and "choice" theories of jurisprudence
Chapter One
introduction
In th is  dissertation I shall examine the trends displayed by the 
judiciary in  interpreting anti-tax avoidance leg is la t io n  and the 
judicial approach to tax avoidance schemes in the United Kingdom and 
Australia. I shall compare th is  with corresponding developments in 
the Republic of South Africa. Additionally. I shall deal, in 
passing, with the position in  the United States of America and in 
Canada. I propose to show how the judges have, on several occasions, 
reached the ir  findings by applying their choice of the competing 
princip les, not by declaring the law as they find i t  to be.
A consideration of the judiciary's approach to anti-tax avoidance 
leg is la t io n  and of the cases where tax avoidance schemes have come 
before the courts for decision leaves one with an impression o f  the 
swing of a pendulum. In the Hamlyn Lectures HH Monroe demonstrated
the way in which judges in England have, by reason of personal 
persuasion, not been unwilling to le g is la te  ju d ic ia lly  in order to
plug the holes which they perceive Parliament has l e f t .  The same 
observations may be made about cases decided in South Africa and in 
Aus tra l ia .
I shall  show how the i n i t i a l  approach was a s t r i c t ,  l e g a l i s t i c  one. 
On the contrary, the approach adopted by the judiciary nowadays 
stresses  the commercial substance or underlying purpose of a scheme. 
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to advance an explanation for the change in
approach. I t  seems that i t  may l i e  in the frustration experienced by 
the jud ic iary  in dealing with cases brought before them, where the 
l e g i s l a t i o n  which they are required to apply cannot adequately cope 
with the schemes evolved to circumvent the l e g i s l a t i o n .  However, how 
one can f i t  t h a t  explanation into a science of ju r isp rud en t ia l  
analysis becomes even more d i f f i c u l t ,  and, as I shall show, the lack 
of a ju r isp ruden t ia l  explanation makes the task of an income tax
adviser  d i f f i c u l t .
The approach of le g is la t io n  by the judiciary has tended to
o b l i t e ra t e  the d is t in c t io n  created by the doctrine of "substance" 
and "form". In the recent  English tax avoidance cases the
distinction between "form" and "substance" has become blurred to 
such an extent that the "form" of the transaction i s  new almost
irrelevant. This i s  also the case in South Africa. To some degree
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t h is  may be attributed  to  the fa ilu re  to  appreciate the nature o f  a 
tax on "income", which i s  not “income" in an economic or commercial 
sense, but in  a technical sense , and which allows deductions or 
allowances in ca lcu la tin g  "income" which are technical deductions, 
which would not necessarily  be deductible or allowable in  the  
economic or commercial sense . I t  appears that some judges in South 
Africa do not understand the d is t in c t io n  which ar ise s  in income tax  
cases between a "tax lo ss" ,  as opposed to an "economic lo ss  : to 
allow a taxpayer the b en efit  of a "loss" which i s  not an "economic 
loss" seems to  offend against the judges' fe e l in g s  of what i s  and 
what i s  not r ig h t.  In South African law th is  confusion i s  frequently  
demonstrated by the judges' reference to "profit" and "loss", where 
those concepts Play no pari, by d e f in it io n ,  in determining "income" 
or "expenditure", as these terms are defined and used in the Income 
Tax Act, No 58 of 1962, as amended.
In th is  d isser ta tio n  I shall deal with the posit ion  in  the United 
K i n g d o m  f i r s t ,  because income tax law developed there f i r s t ,  and the  
systems in South Africa and Australia both owe th e ir  orig in  to  the
law in that country.
5083g/RWFS
841012
6.
Chapter Two
The interpretation of f i ^ a l  leg is la t io n  in the United Kingdom
In Partington v Attorney General (1869) LR 4 E & I App HL 100 at 122
Lord Cairns held:
" . . . . . . i f  the person sought to be taxed comes within
M B m
words o f the statute."
The original approach was that adherence to the statutory words was 
the judicial motto when tax was claimed, but l ia b i l i t y  for tax was 
not clearly imposed. I t  was adherence to the words used, rather than 
to the sense, to what the statute said rather than to what the 
statute meant. I t  i s  interesting to note that Lord Cairns had been 
Solic itor  General and Attorney General, and as Member of Parliament 
for B elfast, had been present when the B ill which became the Income 
Tav Art 1R53 was debated in Parliament.
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Lord Cairn 's  a t t i t u d e  to the in te rp re ta t io n  of  f i s c a l  l e g i s l a t io n  
should be compared with his attitude to Interpretation* as expressed 
in  Hammersmith and City Railways Company V  Brand (1869) LR 4E & I 
A p p  Hi 171, reported in the  same volume of the law reports  as the 
previous case. In th is  case Lord Cairns rejected the narrow
c o n s t r u c t i o n  ad op ted  by t h e  majority  o f  t h e  court ,  namely, tha t
compensation was only due for  damage susta ined when authorised works 
were ca r r ied  out ,  being damage d i rec t ly  occasioned by the carrying 
put o f  the work. He concluded, after reviewing the law, that a land
owner had no d i r e c t  claim against  the railway cc®« ;ny in respect  of 
Works which were posi t ive ly  authorised by Parliament, He held, a t  
page 215:
“That f a c t  alone would ce r ta in ly  predispose the  mind 
to  f in d ,  in the enactment upon the sub ject ,  
compensation given, in some form or o ther ,  fo r  the 
lo ss  which beyond a ll  doubt, the land owner m such a 
case sus ta in s .  I do not mean to say t h a t  i t  would be 
safe to strain the  words of an Act of Parliament on 
account of considerations of th a t  kind, but  i f  there  
be any doubt or ambiguity in  the words, the 
consideration ought not to be overlooked t h a t ,  beyond 
a l l  doubt, the in ten t ion  of l e g i s la t io n  oi th i s  kind 
i s  that, in some shape or o ther ,  compensation should 
be made to those who sus ta in  loss  or harm by the 
operation of the Parliamentary powers,
In Pryce v Monmouthshire Channel and Railway Company. (1879) 
4 AC 197(HL) Lord Cairns suggested an explanation as to  why he was 
prepared to take a wider view where compensation was in i s sue ,  and a 
narrower view i f  tax was in issue.  He held.
5083g/RWFS
841012
8
"The cases which have decided th a t  taxing acts  are to 
be construed with s t r i c tn e s s  and th a t  no payment i s  to 
be extracted  from the subject  which i s  not c lea r ly  and 
unequivocally required by Act of Parliament to  be 
made, probably meant l i t t l e  more than t h i s , t h a t ,  
inasmuch as there  was no a p r io r i  l i a b i l i t y  in' a 
subject  to  pay an’? p a r t i c u la r  tax ,  nor any antecedent 
re la t ionsh ip  bet ~-en the taxpayer and the taxing 
a u th o r i ty , no reasoning founded upon any supposed 
re la t ionsh ip  of  the taxpayer and the taxing authori ty  
could be brought to bear on the construction of the 
Act, and there fo re  the taxpayer had a r ig h t  to stand 
upon a l i t e r a l  construction of the words used, 
whatever might be the  consequence."
Rowlatt J in Cape Brandy Syndicate v IRC (1929) 12 TC 358, a t  366, 
foilwed t h i s  approach where he held:
" I t  simply means th a t  in a taxing Act one has to look 
a t  what i s  clearly sa id .  There i s  no room for  any 
intendment. There i s  no equity about a tax. There is  
no presumption as to a tax. Nothing i s  to be read in ,  
nothing i s  to be implied. One can only look f a i r l y  a t  
the language used."
Lord Clyde extended the implication of th i s  ruling in Ayreshire 
Pullman Motor Services and Ritchie v IRC (1929) 14 TC 754, a t  763, 
where he held?
"No man in t h i s  country i s  under the smallest  
ob l iga t ion ,  moral or other, so to arrange his legal 
re la t io n s  to his business or to his property as to 
enable the Inland Revenue to  put the l a rg e s t  possible 
shovel into  his s to re s .  The Inland Revenue i s  not slow 
« and quite  r igh t ly  - to take every advantage which i s  
open to i t  under the taxing s ta tu te s  for  the purpose 
of depleting the taxpayer 's  pocket. And the taxpayer 
i s ,  in l ik e  manner, e n t i t l e d  to be a s tu te  to  prevent , 
so f a r  as he honestly can, the depletion of his means 
by the Revenue".
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The normal rule  of in te rp re ta t io n  of taxing s t a tu te s  i s  t h a t  where 
there i s  ambiguity the taxpayer should have the benef i t  of the 
doubt. See Scott  v Russell (1945) 30 TC 375, per Viscount Simons a t  
424, and Kanjee Naranjee v iTComrs (1965) AG 1238 (PC).
This p r inc ip le  has been c u t  down in the case of a provision which 
gives r e l i e f  from a sect ion which c lea r ly  imposes l i a b i l i t y .  See 
Littman v Barron [1951] 2 All ER 393 a t  398 per Cohen Ld, affirmed 
sub nom Barron v Llttman (1953) 33 TC 373.
The courts have developed three  principal  ru les  of in te rp re ta t io n ,  
known as the " l i t e r a l  rule", the  "Golden Rule" and the ' 'mischief 
ru le" .
In C le r ic a l ,  Medical and General Life Assurance Society v Carter 
(1889) 22 QBD 444 a t  448 i t  was held, per Lord Esher MR, th a t  i t  
will  be presumed th a t  a l l  s t a tu te s  use words in their popular sense, 
unless the  context  otherwise requires. In t h i s  way the words of a 
s ta tu te  wil l be given t h e i r  ordinary grammatical meaning. However, 
where the " l i t e r a l "  ru le  gives r i s e  to an u n re a l i s t i c  r e s u l t ,  the 
"Golden Rule", as expressed by Lord Wensleydalt in Grey v Pearson 
(1857) 6 HLC 61 a t  106, will be applied.  The ordinary sense of the 
words will be modified to avoid absurdity or inconsis tency.
The "mischief" ru le  was derived from Haydon's case (1584) 3 Co Rep 
7, in which the Barons of the Exchequer held tha t :
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"for  the sure and t rue  in te rp re ta t io n  of a l l  s t a tu te s  
in general four things are to be discerned and 
considered:
(1) what was the common law before the passing of the
Act;
(2) what was the mischief and defect  for  which the
common law did not provide;
(3) what remedy the Parliament l a t e r  resolved and 
appointed to cure the  disease of the  Commonwealth;
(4) the  t rue  reason of the remedy;
And then th e  o f f ice  of a l l  the judges i s  always to 
make such construction as shall suppress the  mischief
and advance the remedy, and to  suppress subtle
invention and evasions for  the continuance of the 
mischief" .
The p r inc ip le s  applicable  to  the in te rp re ta t io n  of f i sca l  
l e g i s l a t i o n  were summarised by Lord Donovan in Mangin v IRC {1971} 
AC 739 a t  746 as follows:
" F i r s t ,  the words are to be given t h e i r  ordinary 
meaning. They are not to  be given some o ther  meaning 
simply because t h e i r  object  i s  to f r u s t r a t e  leg i t imate  
tax avoidance devices . .  Secondly, . .  one has to look 
a t  what i s  c le a r ly  sa id .  There i s  no room fo r  an 
intendment. There i s  no equity about a tax. There i s  
no presumption as to  tax .  Nothing is  to be read in ,  
nothing i s  to be implied. One can only look f a i r l y  a t  
the language u se d . . .  Thirdly, the objec t  of the 
construction of a s t a tu t e  being to ascer ta in  the will 
of the l e g i s l a tu re  i t  may be presumed th a t  ne i ther  
i n ju s t i c e  nor absurdi ty was intended. I f ,  the re fo re ,  a 
l i t e r a l  in te rp re ta t io n  would produce such a r e s u l t ,  
and the language admits of an in te rp re ta t ion  which 
would avoid i t ,  then such an in te rp re ta t io n  may be 
adopted. Fourthly, the h is to ry  of an enactment and the 
reasons which Ted to  i t  being passed may be used as an 
aid to i t s  construct ion".
At around the time of the Second World War the ju d ic ia l  a t t i t u d e  
began to change, and tax avoidance arrangements began to a t t r a c t  the 
h o s t i l i t y  of the Courts. The h o s t i l i t y  towards these schemes was
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also manifested in the United States of America. The s t ronges t  and 
most robust manifestat ion of the ju d ic i a l  a t t i tu d e  of h o s t i l i t y  in 
the United Kingdom was the speech of Lord Greene MR in Lord Howard 
de Walden v IRC (1941) 25 TC 121, a t  134, where he remarked:
"It scarcely l i e s  in the month of the taxpayer who
plays with f i r e  to complain of burnt f ing e rs ."
Lord Denning MR, who has strong views against  tax avoidance schemes, 
appears to adopt the  view t h a t  one should look a t  the avoidance 
scheme f i r s t ,  which comes close to applying the "mischief" ru le .  See
Escoigne Propert ies Ltd v IRC (1958) AC 549 a t  565 and Shop and
Store Developments v IRC (1966) Ch D 108 a t  130.
In Shop S Store Developments Ltd the capi ta l  of the taxpayer was
re-organised and increased.  A number of shares were issued to the 
shareholders in the taxpayer, who t ran s fe r red  these to a clo thing 
company. In the r e s u l t ,  the c lothing company acquired more than 90% 
of the shares in the taxpayer, a property owning company. The
clo th ing  company then t rans fe r red  valuable freehold and leasehold 
properties to  the taxpayer, to be sa t is f ie d  by the issue of  
renounceable l e t t e r s  of allotment,  being the whole of the unissued 
capi ta l  of the taxpayer. The l e t t e r s  of allotment  were sold to an 
issuing house, which, after being s p l i t ,  were offered to the public .  
They were taken up and were paid for .  The money received in t h i s  way 
was passed back through the c lo thing company to the shareholders in
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the taxpayer. It was all part of one arrangement. All the stages 
prior to the public issue took place on one day, and were dealt with 
one agenda comprising 28 items- In his judgment Lord Denning MRi n 
held:
"In my opinion the Revenue authorities are right. Wesjrors&re
intended to remedy and give i t  an interpretation which
w ill  prevent the m ischief-”
in terms o f Section 460 of TA 1970, which i s  aimed at transactions 
designed to avoid tax, the courts have been given statutory
authority to look at transactions as a whole, which can come close
to adopting the "mischiet rule".
Lord Denning's views on tax avoidance are demonstrated in re 
Western's Settlements (1969] 1 Ch D 223 at 242. In that case 
settlements were entered into when capital gains tax did not e x is t .  
In the following year, 1965, Parliament imposed a capital gains tax
payable on capital gained between persons resident in the United 
Kingdom. The tax was calculated at the rate of 30%. The taxpayer 
took steps to remove his family to the Channel islands together with 
the trust. After three months the taxpayer applied to the Chancery 
Division to sanction the removal of the settlement to Jersey, on the 
grounds that this would be tc the financial advantage of the young 
rhildren and unborn children. Lord Denning MR held (at O/l c \
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be born-
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I * * !
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b l e s s i n g^ T h e^ iu d ge ™ “ i d  hi”  a p p 'r o v a T  sTZu'T.
I w o u l d  dismiss th is appeal.
With respect. Lord Denning's judgment in Western^ case demonstrates 
the extent to which personal prejudice governs the judgments in many 
tax avoidance cases. I t  is  d i f f i c u l t ,  putting i t  at i t s  lowest, to 
extract any principle of law from th is  quotation which could be used 
as a basis of advising on a tax avoidance scheme. The "principle" 
established in  Wes tern's case i s  devoid of definable content, 
however laudable the sentiment may be, and however well i t  was
expressed by Lord Denning MR.
In LatflTa v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1942] 1 All ER 214, the 
appellant's w ife, her two daughters and another woman, all resident 
in the United Kingdom, had sold their  shares in a partnership 
carrying on the business of mining in Rhodesia to a trust. The trust  
was resident in Southern Rhodesia. The consideration for the sale  
consisted of shares and non-interest bearing debentures in a 
company. The company declared ru dividends, but applied i t s  profits  
in redeeming the debentures which i t  had issued. The appellant 
contended that the share of the profits derived from the mining 
partnership was not l ia b le  to income tax, but th is  was disallowed. 
The approach of the Appeal Court was approved and upheld in Latilla. 
v CIR (19431 AC 377 Lord Simon held, at 381, in regard to 
arrangements to avoid "sharing the appropriate burden of British
taxation"-
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B1S S I
manoeuvres."
v ^ ta v  V IRC (nos. 1 and 2 ) (1980) STC 10 the "normal meaning" 
rule of interpretation was se t  aside. Two interpretations o f  the 
section were possible. The one. arrived at by looking at the 
preamble to the section and by reading the section as a whole, would 
confine i t s  application. On that bas is . Lord Wilberforce held that 
the section would be:
directed against persons who transfer ^assets  
those assets."
The alternative interpretation was to give the Whole section an 
extended meaning, so as to embrace a ll  persons, born or unborn, who 
in any way might benefit from assets transferred abroad by others.
The House of Lords selected the narrower interpretation, namely,
that the taxpayer to be taxed is  the person who deliberately puts 
his assets outside the tax net. In reaching th is  conclusion the
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House of Lords had to reverse  t h e i r  e a r l i e r  decision in Congreve v 
IRC [1948] 1 All ER 948(HL), despite  the f a c t  i t  was a case which 
had received the express approval of the  1955 Royal Commission* 
Furthermore, when the sect ion in question was introduced in 
Parliament in 1936 any in ten t ion  to v i s i t  on the children the s ins 
of the fa thers  was expressly disclaimed. (Hansard 1936 Vol 313 uol 
688, c i ted  by Monroe). ,
Monroe expresses the view th a t  the Vestey case shows th a t  where 
l e g i s l a t io n  is  aimed a t  d isposi t ions  which have tax avoidance as 
t h e i r  sole or pr incipal  ob jec t ,  even though the House of Lords had 
previously declared in favour of a wide in te rp re ta t io n ,  i f  an 
a l t e rn a t iv e  view i s  poss ib le ,  reason and fa i rness  can prevail  in 
favour of an individual taxpayer. This view has not , however, 
received much support in  the  recent decisions of the House of  Lords!
Vestey v IRC (No 1 and 2) (1980) STC 10 HL raised two important 
po in ts .  These are the  circumstances t h a t  must e x is t  before a 
previous decision of the  House of  Lords will be reconsidered, and 
secondly, the s ta tu s  of ex t ra -s ta tu to ry  concessions. In regard to 
the s ta tus  of e a r l i e r  decisions of the House of Lords, Lord 
Wilberforce expressed the view t h a t  the Pract ice  Direction [1966] 3 
All ER 77, which enables the  Law Lords to reverse previous decisions 
in the House, should be used sparingly and should be governed by 
s ta ted  p r in c ip le s .  He qua l i f ied  th i s  by s ta t in g  th a t  where the fac ts
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of  a case could not be brought within these p r in c ip le s ,  i t  would not 
necessar i ly  be f a t a l . The doctr ine of precedent and c e r ta in ty  of 
i n t e r e s t  usually d ic ta te  t h a t  once a decision has been reached i t  
should be applied subsequently to new and unforeseen circumstances. 
In Vestey's case he thought th a t  to  follow the previous decision 
would c rea te  serious administrat ive  and const i tu t iona l  problems. He 
did not e laborate  on what he had in mind, although in the context  of 
the  case he may have meant t h a t  the  Revenue's prac t ice  of granting 
ex t ra - s ta tu to ry  concessions, having no basis  in law, was an abuse of 
the ru le  of law.
In his judgment Lord Edmund-Davies pointed out  tha t  i t  was d i f f i c u l t  
t o  reconcile  the p rac t ice  of granting e x t ra -s ta tu to ry  concessions 
with the  view expressed by Lord Loreburn in Drummond v Col 1 ins 
(1915) 6 TC 525, a t  539, namely t h a t  i f  a person comes within the 
l e t t e r  of the law, he must be taxed i r respec t ive  of how inequitable  
the tax i s .
Jud ic ia l  comment regarding ex t ra - s ta tu to ry  concessions has been 
mixed. In F S Securi t ies  Ltd v IRC (1963) 41 TC 666, a t  683, 
Donovan LJ held th a t  the income tax code was d i f f i c u l t  to 
administer,  and th a t  p rac t ica l  considerations j u s t i f i e d  some 
departure from the s tr ic t  law fo r  the common convenience of the 
Revenue and of the taxpayer. In Bates V IRC (1966) 44 TC 225* a t  
268, Lord Upjohn expressed the view th a t  concessions had ar isen
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because the Commissioners, r e a l i s in g  the r e s u l t  of applying the 
le g i s l a t io n  s t r i c t l y ,  worked out more equitable  ways of  operating 
i t .  He was unable, however, to understand the legal basis  of 
e x t ra - s ta tu to ry  concessions. He commented favourably in Korner v IRC 
(1969) 45 TC 287, a t  297, on an unpublished concession. Lord 
Wilberforce, in IRC v Bates , supra , held th a t  administrat ive  
moderation was no su b s t i tu te  fo r  l e g i s l a t i v e  c l a r i t y  and prec is ion .  
As opposed to t h i s ,  Lord Radclif fe  held,  in IRC v Frere (1964) 42 TC 
125, a t  154, t h a t  he never understood how ex tra - s ta tu to ry  
concessions came into  opera t ion,  having regard to the  f a c t  tha t  
Parliament could and does adjust the income tax  code every year .  
Scott  Ld endorsed the finding in Absalon y Talbot (1943) 26 TC 166, 
a t  181, t h a t  ju d ic ia l  countenance ought not to  be given to 
e x t r a - s ta tu to ry  concessions, despite  the f a c t  th a t  in many cases 
they avoided undue hardship. Their existence was, in his view, 
ind ica t ive  of  the  f a c t  t h a t  the  l e g i s la t io n  was defective*
This analysis of some decisions over s1 period of about one hundred 
years shows how the trend has swung from the form al is t ic  towards a 
purposive in te rp re ta t io n ,  as also the extent  to  which personal 
prejudice plays a p a r t .  I t  a lso  shows how the jud ic ia ry  has had to 
deal with e x t ra - s ta tu to ry  concessions. In doing so the jud ic ia ry  has 
had to reso r t  to a power to  l e g i s l a t e ,  for how otherwise can they 
a f f i x  a stamp of approval to an ex t ra - s ta tu to ry  concession?
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Chapter Three
The a t t i tu d e  of the English Courts towards ''form" a n d _ ^ ubstaoce^
Where a taxpayer has entered in to  a se r ies  of a r t i f i c i a l  
t ransac t ions  in order to  create  a lo ss  or to  avoid an assessment to 
tax  a doctr ine ,  known as "the sham doctr ine" ,  i s  sometimes c i t ed  by 
the Revenue in a ttacking the scheme in question. For example, in 
Ellbeck v Rawllng (1981) STC 174 (HL) which *111 be dealt with 
l a t e r ,  the taxpayer manufactured a capi ta l  gains tax loss by the use 
of a reversionary i n t e r e s t  and an advance from a set t lement.  All the 
t ransac t ions  were pre-arranged and were ca r r ied  out with what the 
courts  have described as "mil i tary precis ion" .  The Revenue r e l i e d  on 
the "sham" doctr ine in a t tacking the scheme in th a t  case.
The "sham doctr ine" f i r s t  developed as a r e s u l t  of a number of h i re  
purchase and b i l l s  of sa le  cases.  See Stonelelgh F inance_Ltd__v 
P h i l l ip s  [1965] 1 All ER 513(CA).
"Sham" i s  defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as -
"something th a t  i s  intended to be taken fo r  something 
e l s e ,  or th a t  is  not what i t  purports  to be; a 
spurious imita t ion ,  a c o u n te r fe i t  . . .  something not 
genuine or t ru e ."
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In Snook v London and West Riding Investments Limited [1967] 1 All 
ER 518, a t  528, Diplock L J put forward the following d e f in i t ion ;
" . . .  i f  i t  has any meaning in law, i t  means acts  done 
or documents executed by the p a r t i e s  to the "sham" 
which are intended by them to  give to th i rd  p a r t i e s  or 
to the court  the appearance of creat ing  between the 
pa r t i e s  legal r igh ts  and obligat ions d i f f e r e n t  from 
the actual legal r igh ts  and obligat ions ( i f  any) which 
the p a r t ie s  inte:.d to c r e a t e . "
For the t ransac t ion  to be t rea ted  as a sham, having regard to what 
Diplock L J held, there roust be an in tent ion  on the pa r t  of the
p a r t i e s  to  mislead, and there  must he an element of incompleteness
or dece i t .  Diplock 10 s t ip u la ted  th a t  the re  must be a common
in ten t ion  th a t  the acts  or documents are intended not to create  the 
legal  r ig h ts  and obligat ions  which they give the  appearance of 
c rea t ing .  I t  i s  normally the second leg of t h i s  t e s t  which prevents 
the  Revenue from successfully invoking the doctrine in the United 
Kingdom, even where the t ransac t ions  are p a r t  of a highly a r t i f i c i a l  
tax scheme. I t  follows th a t  where a t ransac t ion  or document is
genuine and creates legal rights and obligat ions intended by the 
p a r t i e s ,  i t  cannot be s e t  aside as a sham, however a r t i f i c i a l  or 
commercially u n ju s t i f i a b le  the t ransac t ions  may be. In the r e s u l t ,  
the Revenue do not often seek to maintain the  "sham" argument in 
cases which come before the court .  See Black Nominees l t d  v Nichol 
(1975) 50 TC 229, a t  250.
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As one cannot c la s s i fy  a l l  tax avoidance schemes as being f a l s e  or 
sham, and having regard to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  of es tab l ish ing  a sham, 
the Revenue tends to re ly  on the "form and substance" doctr ine  more 
of ten .  The argument follows the l ine  th a t  although the t ransac t ions  
when taken in i so la t ion  fa ll  outside the scope of the s t a t u t e ,  when 
taken together  as a scheme, the t ransac t ions  can be brought within 
the s t a tu t e  on the basis th a t  they represent  the s i tu a t io n  posi ted 
by the s t a tu t e .  In other  words, i t  i s  argued t h a t  the courts should 
ignore the legal e f f e c t  of the t ransac t ions ,  and should su b s t i tu te  
the substance of the  t ransac t ions  when taken together.
Some early  decisions supported the argument t h a t  in revenue matters 
a court  might ignore the form of a t ransac t ion  in favour of i t s  
economic e f f e c t  in which the tax avoiding in tent ion  was present . See 
IRC v Wright (1926) 11 TO 198 a t  203.
The form and substance doctrine  was considered and es tab l ished  in 
Duke of Westminster v IRC (1935) 19 TC 490 and IRC v Duke of 
Westminster (1936) AC 1. As remarked by HH Monroe in a posthumously 
published a r t i c l e ,  Fiscal Finesse: Tax Avoidance and the Duke of 
Westminister 1982 B r i t i sh  Tax Review 200, the Duke of Westminster i s  
the s t a r t i n g  point ,  since i t  has been id e n t i f i e d ,  “un fa i r ly ,  as some 
kind of tax avoider 's  char ter" .
In t h a t  case the taxpayer contracted with his  personal servants to
5083g/RWFS
841012
22*
t r a n s fe r  to  them a s l i c e  of his income, who paid tax on the amount 
so t rans fe r red  a t  a lower r a t e .  The servants  acknowledged a t  the 
same time th a t  the t r an s fe r  of income was by way of remuneration for  
t h e i r  se rv ices ,  without looking fo r  wages as well.  In th i s  way the 
taxpayer would reduce h is  income tax.  By a majority of  4 to 1 the 
House of Lords re jected the claim by the Revenue to disallow the 
payments under the  covenant as a surtax deduction, on the grounds 
th a t  w hi ls t  the  payments had the legal character  of annu i t ies ,  in 
substance they were payments for  serv ices .  The c le a re s t  statement of 
the doctr ine i s  found in the speech of Lord Russell ,  who held, a t  
524i-
"The Commissioners and Mr Ju s t ic e  Finlay took the 
opposite view on the ground th a t ,  as they sa id ,  
looking a t  the substance of the thing the payments 
were payments of wages. This simply means th a t  the 
t rue  legal posi t ion i s  disregarded and a d i f f e r e n t  
legal r ig h t  and l i a b i l i t y  subs t i tu ted  in the place of 
the legal  r igh t  and l i a b i l i t y  which the p a r t ie s  have 
created.  I confess th a t  I view with disfavour the 
doctr ine th a t  in taxation cases the subject  i s  to  be 
taxed i f ,  in accordance with the courts '  view of what 
i t  considers the substance of the t ransac t ion ,  the 
court  thinks th a t  the case f a l l s  within the 
contemplation or s p i r i t  of the s t a tu t e .  The subject  is  
not taxable by inference or by analogy, but only by 
the plain  words of the s t a tu te  applicable to the fac ts  
and circumstances of his case . . .  I f  a l l  t h a t  i s  meant 
by the doctr ine i s  t h a t  having once ascertained the 
legal r igh ts  of the p a r t i e s  you may disregard mere 
nomenclature and decide the question of t a x a b i l i ty  or 
non-taxabil i ty  in accordance with the legal r i g h t s ,  
well and good . . .  I f ,  on the other  hand, the doctr ine 
means th a t  you may brush aside deeds, disregard the 
legal r igh ts  and l i a b i l i t i e s  a r i s ing  under a contrac t  
between p a r t ies  and decide the question of t a x a b i l i ty  
or non-taxabil i ty  upon the footing of the r igh ts  and 
l i a b i l i t i e s  of the pa r t i e s  being d i f f e ren t  from what
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in law they a re ,  then I en t i r e ly  d issen t  from such a 
doc tr ine ."
Lord Tomlin held:
"Every man is  e n t i t l e d  i f  he can to order his  a f f a i r s  
so t h a t  the tax a t taching under the appropriate Acts 
i s  less  than i t  would otherwise be. I f  he succeeds in 
ordering them so as to secure t h i s  r e s u l t ,  then, 
however unappreciative the Commissioner o f  Inland 
Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his 
ingenuity, he canot be compelled to pay an increased 
tax .  This so -ca l led  doctrine  of ' th e  substance1 seems 
to  me to be nothing more than an attempt to  make a man 
pay notwithstanding th a t  he has so ordered h is  a f f a i r s  
t h a t  the amount of tax sought from him i s  not legal ly  
c la im able ."
The l ine  of  decisions which approved th is  approach was followed in 
Vestey 's  (Lord) Executors v IRC [1949] 1 All ER 1108 (HL). Twin 
brothers  entered into a lease  with Union Cold Storage Co Ltd, "UCS", 
and three t ru s tee s  l iv ing  in Pa r is ,  in terms of which they demised 
property s i t u a t e  abroad to UCS for  a period of 21 years ,  terminable 
on 6 months not ice.  UCS undertook to pay to the Paris  t ru s t e e s  a 
ren t  of  £960 000 per annum in quarterly instalments.  I t  was common 
cause t h a t  the Paris t ru s tee s  would have received the ren t  as 
t ru s tee s  for  the brothers. Thereafter ,  a t r u s t  deed was executed in 
terms of  which the bro thers '  children were appointed as 
benef ic ia r ie s  of the t r u s t  fund. The Crown made claims against  the 
brothers fo r  income tax and surtax in respect  of the rents payable 
under the lease ,  and in respect  of the income a r i s ing  from the 
investments and accumulations under the t r u s t  deed. I t  was held th a t
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the lease and deed of t r u s t  together const i tu ted  an "arrangement" 
within the meaning of the Finance Act, 1938, and consequently 
const i tu ted  a "settlement" fo r  the purposes of th a t  Act.
Lord Normand held a t  1120, th a t :
"Parliament in i t s  attempts to  keep pace with the 
ingenuity devoted to tax avoidance may fa l l  short  of 
i t s  purpose. That i s  a misfortune for the taxpayers 
who do not t ry  to avoid t h e i r  share of the burden, and 
i t  i s  disappointing to the Inland Revenue. But the 
Courts will not s t r e tc h  the terms of taxing acts  in 
order to improve on the e f f o r t s  of Parliament and to  
stop gaps which are l e f t  open by the s t a tu t e s .  Tax 
avoidance i s  an e v i l ,  but i t  would be the beginning of 
much greater  ev i l s  i f  the  Courts were to overs tre tch 
the language of the s t a tu t e  in order to subject  to 
taxation  people of whom they disapproved,"
Avoidance of tax  should not be confused with evasion of tax. The
l a t t e r  cons t i tu tes  a fraud, in respect  of which Parliament i s  able 
to  and does impose, Draconian pena l t ie s .  With respect  to Lord
Normand, the statement "tax avoidance is  an evil"  expresses a view
of moral opprobrium which clouds the issue. Similar sentiments have 
been expressed in Parliament in South Africa when emotive issues 
such as tax avoidance are under debate, A s imilar  statement was
recently made by the Minister of Finance in South Africa, in regard 
to  the a u d i to r s ’ profession.  In my view tax avoidance does not merit
the opprobrium cast  upon i t ,  unless i t  can be shown th a t  i t
cons t i tu tes  tax  evasion, in which case the imposition of penal t ies
would not be d i f f i c u l t .  I t  may be argued th a t  income tax i s  the
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p r ice  one must pay for  the p r iv i lege  of l iv ing  in a modern welfare 
s t a t e .  However, th a t  enters  the  arena of social and p o l i t i c a l  issues 
which are not appropriate fo r  t h i s  dissertat ion* The w r i t e r ' s  th e s is  
i s  t h a t  tax law and tax  morality wil l  not coincide, unless the 
u t i l i t y  of tax i s  demonstrated. Unless th i s  i s  done attempts to 
avoid tax  wil l continue. The function of the law i s  to  be c e r ta in ,  
y e t ,  more and more, p a r t i c u la r ly  as a r e s u l t  of  jud ic ia l  
l e g i s l a t i o n ,  the law of tax  i s  uncer ta in .  In t u r n , as tax ra tes  
increase ,  and uncerta in ty  and unfairness develop, tax-paying 
morality declines.
The issue of tax avoidance obliges one to consider the doctrine  of 
“substance" and "form". In IRC v Wesleyan Assurance Society [1948] 1 
All ER 555 (HI), a t  557, i t  was held, approving the dictum o f  Lord 
Greene MR in Duke of Westminster, t h a t  a taxpayer may, in order to 
reduce his  l i a b i l i t y  fo r  tax ,  acquire investments which would 
produce income which the Act does not c la ss i fy  as gross income, or 
which i t  exempts from tax .  Similarly ,  there  may be two methods at  
l e a s t  of achieving the same f inancia l  r e s u l t  -
" I f  one of these methods i s  adopted, tax will be 
payable. I f  the other  method is  adopted tax will not 
be payable. . . . . . .  The net r e s u l t  from the financial
point  of view i s  precise ly  the same in each case, but 
one method of achieving i t  a t t r a c t s  tax and the other 
method does not . There have been cases in the past  
where what has been cal led  the "substance of  the 
t ransaction" has been thought to enable the Court to 
construe a document in such a way as to a t t r a c t  tax. 
That p a r t i c u la r  doctr ine  of substance as d i s t i n c t  from 
form was, I hope, f in a l ly  exploded by the decision of 
the House of Lords in Duke of Westminster v Inland 
Revenue Commissioner."
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The p r inc ip le s  enunciated in the Duke of  Westminster have been 
affirmed by Lord Wilberforce in IRC v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd (1971) AG 
760, a t  771, (PC), by Buckley L J in News tea  d v Frost  (1979) SIC 45, 
a t  5 3 , (CA), by S i r  John Rennycuick in Floor v Davis (1978) SIC 436, 
a t  441,(CA) and by Walton J in Burman v Hedges and p' !t l e r  Ltd (1979) 
SIC 136, a t  147,(ChD).
In re fe r r ing  to  "form", the doctrine  re fe rs  to  the legal r ig h ts  and 
obliga t ions c reated  by the t ransac t ion  or document. I t  means th a t  
i r r e sp e c t iv e  of the way in which the t ransaction i s  dressed up, i t  
wil l  not  necessar i ly  be decisive of i t s  form, although i t  wil l be of 
evidentia l  value.
The term "substance" i s  used in two contexts , and th i s  can lead to 
confusion.
In the  f i r s t  place, where a f inancial  r e s u l t  can be obtained in two 
or more ways, one of which may r e s u l t  in tax being payable, and the 
other  of which may r e s u l t  in no tax being payable* I f  the  second 
method i s  adopted, on the authori ty  of Duke of Westminster and IRC v 
Wesleyan and General Assurance Society , the Revenue will not be able 
to e x t r a c t  the tax th a t  would have been payable had the f i r s t  method 
been adopted.
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In the  second place,  "substance" has a narrower meaning, and th a t  
i s ,  whether in looking a t  the t ransac t ions  and documents as a whole 
i t  would be leg i t imate  to look a t  the  r e s u l t ,  r a the r  than looking a t  
each par t  of the scheme separately and in i so la t io n .
In recent  cases the  Courts have tended to  adopt the narrower 
meaning. For example, in Ransom v Higgs (1974) 50 TC 1, Lord 
Wilberforee held t h a t  the  Courts are e n t i t l e d  to look a t  a l l  the 
t ransac t ions  toge ther ,  where there  i s  evidence th a t  each step i s  
dependant on other s teps ,  in deciding whether the taxpayer was 
t rad in g .  He a lso  took t h i s  view in  Europe O i l , although Lord Donovan 
and Viscount Dilhorne dissented, and held t h a t  legal r igh ts  and 
obliga t ions had to  be taken in i s o l a t i o n ,  and not together .
In Black Nominees v Nichol, supra , a complicated tax avoidance 
scheme was devised by the advisers of  the a c t r e s s ,  J u l i e  C hr is t ie .  
I t  involved the  incorporation of a number of companies and the 
formation of a number of t r u s t s ,  having the purpose of c a p i ta l i s in g  
the  money th a t  she could expect to earn as an ac t ress  so as to avoid 
tax on the income t h a t  she would have earned for  filming and ac t ing  
con trac ts .  Tempieman J ,  as he then was, followed the approach of 
Lord Wilberforee in Ransom. This case was, perhaps, the f i r s t  major 
step away from the "form" towards the "substance" of the 
t ransac t ions  in issue .  He held t h a t  the t ransactions entered in to  by 
the p a r t i c ip a n ts  could not be viewed in i s o la t io n ,  without regard to
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the consequences of the other t ransac t ions .  The scheme as a whole 
had to  be considered, as each step was dependant upon the other  
steps being carr ied  out.  (Tempiemanl J i s  known fo r  h is  negative 
a t t i tu d e s  towards tax avoidance schemes, see W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC 
(1979) STC 582(CA), and Seaman L J  a t  590, and Tempieman L J in 
Eli beck v Rawling (1980) STC 192(CA)).
In E i lbeck 's  case Tempieman L J held, a t  202:
" . . .  one s ingle  c i r c u la r  contrac t  or a s e r ie s  of 
interdependent contracts  which revolves one property 
in a c i r c l e  cannot be divided in to  separate 
t ransac t ions  in  order to determine the e f f e c t  of  the 
con trac t  or s e r i e s ,
A c i r c u la r  contract  which requires one a sse t  to be 
revolved in a c i r c l e  must be judged by the difference 
( i f  any) between the posi t ion of each party a t  the 
s t a r t  and a t  the f in ish  of the con trac t ."
However, in IRC v Plummer (1979) STC 93, a t  97, Lord Wilberforce did 
not accept  the thes is  expressed by Tempieman L J :  He qua l i f ied  the 
proposit ion in  an important respect:
"the plan now involved was explained by the brokers in 
great  deta i l  and i t s  intended accomplishment s e t  out , 
with t imetables ,  in almost m i l i ta ry  prec is ion .  This 
(as I ventured to suggest in IRC v Church 
Commissioners for  England (1976) STC 3 3 9 T e n t i t l e s  and 
requires us to look a t  the plan as a whole. I t  does 
not e n t i t l e  us to disregard the legal form and nature 
of the t ransact ions  ca r r ied  out".
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The d i f f i c u l ty  of d is t inguishing between words th a t  are c le a r  and 
words t h a t  are not c le a r ,  or in deciding what words in the s t a tu te  
mean and whether they apply to p a r t i c u la r  circumstances, which 
amounts + ! ;g is la t ing" (an offs ide  a c t iv i t y )  or " in te rpre t ing"  (an
acceptable a c t i v i t y , )  (per HVH. Monroe) i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in IRC v 
Plummer [1978] 3 All ER 513 (CA).
The case cone rned a straightforward  tax avoidance scheme, in the 
sense t h a t  i t  lacked the complexity, subt le ty  and window dressing 
assoc ia ted  with capi ta l  gains tax avoidance schemes. The taxpayer 
followed the  same route r e l i e d  upon in the Duke of Westminster: in 
re turn  fo r  a lump sum he undertook to make a se r ie s  of annual 
payments. A company with char i tab le  objects  would receive the 
annuity. The company issued a se r ies  of promissory notes, payable 
when each annuity was paid in sa t i s f a c t io n  of the obligation to 
provide the  lump sum, which were t r e a te d  as securi ty  by the 
taxpayer. Each payment of the annuity was by way of overdraf t ,  which 
was extinguished on deposit of  the promissory note. In other words, 
the money went round and round, but a t  the end the taxpayer could 
claim to  have made a number of deductible payments, and the charity 
could claim to have received payments on which tax paid was 
recoverable.
I f  the agreement by which the individual made annual payments to  the
ch a rity  was a "settlem ent" the scheme fa i le d .
5083g/RWFS
841012
29.
The d i f f i c u l ty  of d is t inguishing between words th a t  are c le a r  and 
words t h a t  are  not c le a r ,  or in deciding what words in the s t a tu te  
mean and whether they apply to p a r t i c u la r  circumstances, which 
amounts to  " leg is la t ing "  (an offs ide  a c t iv i ty )  o r  " in terpret ing"  (an 
acceptable a c t i v i t y , )  (per H.H. Monroe) i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  in IRC v 
Plummer [1978] 3 All ER 513 (CA).
The case concerned a straightforward tax  avoidance scheme, in the 
sense t h a t  i t  lacked the complexity, sub t le ty  and window dressing 
associa ted  with capi ta l  gains tax avoidance schemes. The taxpayer 
followed the same route re l i ed  upon in the Duke of Westminster: in 
re tu rn  for  a lump sum he undertook to  make a se r ies  of annual 
payments. A company with char i tab le  objects  would receive the 
annuity. The company issued a se r ies  of promissory no tes , payable 
when each annuity was paid in s a t i s fac t io n  of the obl igat ion to 
provide the lump sum, which were t rea ted  as securi ty  by the 
taxpayer.  Each payment of the annuity was by way of overdraf t ,  which 
was extinguished on deposit of  the promissory note. In other words, 
the money went round and round, but a t  the end the taxpayer could 
claim to  have made a number of deductible payments, and the char i ty  
could claim to have received payments on which tax  paid was 
recoverable.
I f  the agreement by which the individual made annual payments to  the
c h a rity  was a "settlem ent" the scheme fa i le d .
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The agreement did not look l ik e  a se t t lement,  but the s t a tu t e  gave 
to the term:-
"Any d ispos i t ion ,  t r u s t ,  covenant, agreement or arrangement.. .
an extended meaning.
Lords Wiiberforce, Fraser of Tullybelton and Keith of Kinkel a l l  
found th a t  there  was an agreement to pay an annuity. The way in 
which i t  was financed was one of convenience fo r  the taxpayer. He 
chose to  use i t  for  the  provision o f  promissory notes,  but t h a t  did 
not rob the  agreement to  pay an annuity of i t s  legal e f f e c t .
Lord Wiiberforce held:
"This ra ises  a question of some d i f f i c u l ty  and general 
importance. Are the words of the def in i t ion  to be 
given the fu l l  unres t r ic ted  meaning which apparently 
they have, or U  some l im i ta t ion  to be read in to  them, 
and i f  so what l im i ta t ion ?  I f  given the ful l  
un res t r ic ted  meaning, the section would c lear ly  cover 
the present agreement, and would also cover a large 
number of ordinary commercial t ransac t ions .
My Lords, i t  seems to me to be c lea r  th a t  i t  i s  not 
possib le  to read into  the de f in i t ion  an exception in 
favour of commercial t ransac t ions  whether with or 
without the ep i th e t  "ordinary" or "bona f id e ". To do 
so would be l e g i s la t io n  not in te rp re ta t io n :  i f
Parliament had intended such an exception i t  could and 
must have expressed i t .  But i t  s t i l l  becomes necessary 
to enquire what i s  the scope of the words "settlement" 
and " se t t lo r "  and of the words which are included in 
"settlement" in the context in which they appear. I f  
i t  appears, on the one hand, th a t  a completely l i t e r a l
5083g/RWFS
841012
31.
=' li^ riL sr -if L %
„ the r e s u l t  the majority found a l e g i s l a t i v e  purpose: "bounty” was 
;he key to  in te rp re t in g  the sect ion .  As there  was no bounty, there  
(as no se t t lem ent .  There was no bounty in the tax avoidance scheme, 
j u t  1 t  was a bargain for  hard cash. In the r e s u l t ,  there  was no 
"se t t lem ent”. (As I shall  show l a t e r ,  Schreiner JA reached a 
d i f f e r e n t  conclusion in in te rp re t in g  the word "disposi t ion" which he 
held would extend to  cover every ac t  a ffec t ing  property .)
Lords Dilhorne and Diplock, in the minority, arrived at  a d i f ferent  
conclusion.
Lord Dilhorne held:
issssai
n
m s m m w s
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or arrangment should nevertheless continue to be 
t r ea te d  as the  income of the t ran s fe ro r .
Lord Diplock held:
" I t  i s  common ground between my noble and 1 earned 
fr iends  t h a t  upon a l i t e r a l  in te rp re ta t io n  of what, 
according to (the de f in i t ion  s e c t io n ) , i s  understoo 
as included in the expression settlement, the 
t ransac t ion  would f a l l  within i t .  I t  i s  likewise 
common ground that Parliament must have intended some 
narrower construction than th i s  to be Pl®cecl on
%ect1o n T r fo n " u n l ls s  ^  1 ^ ° % ^  d i f f ic u l t  to  think 
W„1„ f  inhant 5 : S^ 0"L eThecon0S t1nfn wjjrS
i^y0r nsSionf t  itwhfcrSthenre11rtir
bounty."
Lord Diplock went on to consider whether there were indications in 
the sections that one or other of these limitations of the statutory 
words were appropriate. He concluded that they were not, and
continued as follows:
M ®
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Parliament rea l ly  have intended to tax th is  part icular  
kind of  transaction by the wide words that the 
draftsman has used?'
I f  the only sensible answer to  th a t  question is  'No1 
the words of the Act should be understood as 
inapplicable  to tha t  t ransac t ion .  That question when 
asked about a t ransac t ion  which not only f a l l s  within 
the l i t e r a l  meaning of the words used in the sect ion 
but has no other  object  than to enable the s e t t l o r  to 
avoid a l i a b i l i t y  to surtax on his income which he 
would^ otherwise be obliged to pay, so far  from 
inv i t ing  the answer 'No' inv i tes  the answer: 'Whatever 
kind of t ransac t ion  Parliament may have intended to 
exclude, i t  cannot have been th is  one ' ."
Monroe demonstrates how in the Plummer case the majority in the 
House of Lords "legislated" for the application of the section, by
construing the section to draw the dividing l ine  in one place, 
w h i l s t  the  minority drew the dividing l ine  in another place. The 
minority judgment echoes the proposition t h a t  Parliament cannot be 
intended not to include a tax  avoidance device within the scope of a 
tax avoidance sect ion .  In other words, the proposition is th a t  when 
anti-avoidance provisions are employed in taxing a c t s ,  adherence to 
the "plain words" used may be abandoned as a guide to construction 
in favour of a broader approach, namely, that of ident ify ing  the 
r i sk ,  danger or mischief.  I t  starts from the hypothesis tha t  
Parliament was aiming a t  t h a t  scheme, and was on target. This echoes 
the proposit ion of Buckley LJ in IRC v Garvin and Rose (1980) SVC
295 where he held:
"a s ta tu to ry  provision aimed a t  r e s t r i c t i n g  tax 
avoidance is  not to be construed in the way which is  
t r a d i t io n a l ly  adopted in construing charging
provisions in taxing s t a t u t e s . "
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In support of th i s  proposition Buckley LJ r e l i ed  on Lord Wilberforce 
in CIR v Jo iner  [1975] 1 WLR 1701, 50 TC 449, who had, in turn ,  
commented on what Lord Reid had said in Greenberg v CIR (1972) AC 
109, 47 TC 240;
"For whereas i t  i s  generally the rule  th a t  c lea r  words 
are  required to impose a t a x ,  so th a t  the taxpayer has 
the benef i t  of doubts or ambiguities. Lord Reid made 
i t  c lear  t h a t  the scheme of the sec t ions ,  introducing 
as they did a wide and general attack on tax  
avoidance, required th a t  expressions which might 
otherwise have been cut  down in the i n t e r e s t  of 
precision were to be given the wide meaning evidently 
intended, even though they led to a conclusion short  
of which judges would normally desire  to stop."
Buckley LJ concluded th a t  th i s  meant t h a t  in dealing with an 
anti-avoidance sect ion he should adopt the approach which he later 
adopted in Berry v Warnett (1980) SIC 514. This case involved an 
avoidance device and not an anti-avoidance sect ion.  He held:
"This, as I understand i t ,  does not mean th a t  a court  
should o ff ic ious ly  s t r iv e  to construe a sect ion in i t s  
widest possible  signif icance in order to give i t  the 
widest possible operation, but th a t  one must look fo r  
the  meaning evidently intended by the language used 
bearing in mind the object  of th i s  sect ion ,  and apply 
t h a t  sect ion accordingly without giving e i th e r  the 
taxpayer or the Revenue the benef i t  of any doubt or 
ambiguity."
The decisions in Chinn v Hochstrasser (Inspector of Taxes) [19/9] 
2 WLR 411 and in Chinn v Collins (Inspector of Taxes) [1979] 2 WLR
411 demonstrate the new approach by the courts to tax avoidance.
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In terms of Paragraph 13 of Schedule 7 to the Finance Act, 1975, no 
chargeable gain shall accrue on the disposal of an i n t e r e s t  under a 
se t t lement  by any person except one who acquired i t  as ,  or through, 
a purchaser fo r  value, Chinn (and his  b ro th e r ) , having a contingent 
i n t e r e s t  in a se t tlement by his father of 370 100 shares in Lex 
Garages, h is  fa the r  being a d i rec to r  and j o i n t  chairman, and the 
Chinn family owning 909 572 shares, representing 25% of the equity , 
was e n t i t l e d  to se l l  his i n t e r e s t  to  a th i rd  party without himself 
incurring any l i a b i l i t y  to capi ta l  gains tax. A scheme was evol'u-d 
in terms of which, using merchant bankers in Guernsey and Jersey,  
the following steps were taken:
( a ) On 31 March 1969, a Rothschild subsidiary bank and two
employees, a l l  re s id en t  outside the United Kingdom, replaced 
the United Kingdom res id en t  t ru s tee s .
(b) On 28 October 1969, the t ru s tee s  appointed 184 500 shares to
Chinn absolute ly , contingent on his survival past  midnight on 
31 October/1 November 1969.
(c) Chinn sold his  i n t e r e s t  to another Rothschild subs id iary ,  
"Rose'!", with a paid up capita l  of £150, for  £352 705, payable 
on 1 November 1969. The middle market price  of 184 500 Lex
shares as a t  27 October 1969 was £355 162,50. Insurance on
Chinn's l i f e  to cover the intervening period was taken up.
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(d) On se l l in g  his i n t e r e s t  to  Rose!, Chinn contracted to buy from 
Rose! fo r  delivery in Guernsey on 1 November 1969, time being 
of the essence, 184 500 Lex shares fo r  £355 162,50, and handed 
to the bank a l e t t e r  asking t h a t  his account be debited on 
1 November 1969 with th a t  sum. This means th a t  the "real 
money" t h a t  passed was the difference of £2 457,50.
(e) On 1 November 1969, the reg is te red  owner of a l l  the  370 100 
Lex sha res , a nominee fo r  the foreign t r u s t e e s , was not if ied  
by them th a t  184 500 shares were benef ic ia l ly  owned by Chinn.
(The same fa c t s  applied in re la t ion  to a scheme in respect of
Chinn's bro ther) .
The Revenue launched a three pronged a t t a c k < The Revenue contended, 
firs t t y  4 t h a t  the scheme was a composite whole, whose sole legal 
e f f e c t  was the intended end r e s u l t .  Consequently, Rosel 's purchase
o f  the  in t e r e s t  was to  be discarded as mere machinery for  effec t ing  
the  taxpayer 's  purpose. Secondly, th a t  in all the circumstances the 
con trac t  to  buy from Rose! was a contract  to buy back the parcel of 
shares ,  fo r  which he had paid,  and consequently th a t  he had an 
equitab le  i n t e r e s t  in  the pa rce l ,  ana  therefore  th a t  i t  was j u s t  and 
reasonable to  apportion the whole of the gain to him. Thirdly,
re ly ied  on sect ion 42 of the Finance Act, on the grounds tn a t  the
scheme was "an arrangement" under which Chinn was the beneficiary.
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Before the  Special Commissioners the f i r s t  and second attacks 
f a i l e d ,  but  the th i rd  a ttack succeeded. Before Tempieman J (as he 
then was) the f i r s t  l ine  of attack was not mentioned, but the second 
and t h i r d  both succeeded. In the Court of Appeal, however, a l l  three 
a t tacks  f a i l e d
In Chinn v Collins (1981) STC 1(HL), Lord Wilberforce modified the 
approach he had adopted in Plummer's case. He held th a t  where there 
i s  a prearranged, pre-draf ted  tax  avoidance scheme, the Court i s  
e n t i t l e d  to  look a t  the plan as a whole without disregarding the 
legal form and nature of the t ransac t ions .
In Floor v Davis (Inspector of Taxes) [19/8] 2 All ER 1079: [1979] 2 
All ER 677 the  taxpayers evolved a scheme in order to se l l  t h e i r  
shares in one company to  another company. A th i rd  company was 
incorporated,  so the shares in the  f i r s t  company were sold to the 
second company via the newly incorporated company, in consideration 
of an allotment of shares,  and a subsequent t r an s fe r  of shares for  a 
cash considera tion.  This was followed by re-organisat ion of the 
incorporated company and i t s  l iqu ida t ion ,  which had the e f fe c t  of 
passing i t s  a s se t s ,  including the cash received from the purchasing 
company, to  a fourth company, reg is te red  in the Cayman Islands. I t  
was held t h a t  the t ransactions which made up the f i r s t  stage of the 
t ransac t ion  could not be regarded as a disposal by the taxpayers of 
the shares . In a dissenting judgment Eveleigh L J held:
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I t  is c lea r  th a t  r i g h t  from the beginning the 
American Company (KOI) indicated t h a t  it would 
purchase the shares. The only reason for  avoiding a 
d i r e c t  sa le  to them was the  prospect  of capital gains 
tax .  In an attempt to  avoid paying t h i s ,  as i s  frankly 
accepted, the i n i t i a l  t r a n s fe r  to FNW took place. 
There was however no real p o s s ib i l i ty  a t  any time th a t  
the  shares would not reach the American Company. By 
v i r tue  of th e i r  control of FNW the shareholders 
guaranteed from the moment they parted with the legal 
ownership th a t  the shares would become the property of  
the  American Company. No-one could prevent t h i s  
agains t  t h e i r  wishes. By v ir tue  of the arrangement 
i n i t i a l l y  made between them each was under an 
obl iga t ion  to the other to  do nothing to stop the 
shares a r r iv ing  in the hands of the American Company. 
They control led  the destiny of the shares from 
beginning to  end in pursuance of a continuing 
in ten t ion  on th e i r  part t h a t  the shares should be 
t r a n s fe r re d  to  KDI."
This view has received approval in two speeches in the House of 
Lords, p a r t i c u la r ly  in Furnfss v Dawson ( i n f r a ) . Eveleigh LJ was 
a t t r a c te d  by the  a l t e r  ego theory of the intermediate 
purchaser/vendor. He based his judgment on the f a c t  t h a t  A sold the 
shares in  X Ltd to  Z Ltd, because A a t  a l l  times control led Y Ltd, 
the  intermediate purchaser/vendor. In other words he was not 
constrained to observe the separate  legal personali ty  of the  
intermediate  purchaser.
In Eilbeck v Rawling; W T Ramsay Ltd v IRC (1981) STC 174(HL), two 
appeals were heard together . They both involved the question whether 
a tax avoidance scheme which involved a number of separate 
t ransac t ions ’, none of which was a sham, should be considered as one 
t ransac t ion  comprising a number of sub-t ransact ions ,  or as two
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groups of t ransac t ions .  I f  the f i r s t  view was accepted, the
taxpayer 's  capi ta l  loss would be the difference between his posit ion 
a t  the  s t a r t  of the scheme and his posi t ion a t  the end of the
scheme. In e f f e c t ,  the capita l  loss  would be r e s t r i c t e d  to the  fees 
paid to the  promoters of the scheme. I f  the second view was
accepted, the  scheme would produce a deductible capi ta l  loss and a 
matching, non-taxable, capi ta l  gain. The House of Lords unanimously 
accepted the  f i r s t  view, the main speeches being by Lord Wilberforce 
and Lord Fraser  of Tullybelton.
In W T Ramsay Limited v %RC [1981] 1 All ER 865 (HL) a farming
company r e a l i s ed  a chargeable gain of £188 000 on the sale  of farm
land in Lincolnshire .  In order to  mit igate the capi ta l  gains tax 
t h a t  would be payable, the  taxpayer embarked on a scheme designed to 
manufacture a paper loss of £175 647 by means of a se r ies  of loan 
and share t ransac t ions .  The scheme was characterised by the fac t
the re  was no commercial j u s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  i t ,  nor was there  any 
prospect  of a p r o f i t  There was bound to be a small loss in the form 
of the fees and exp in- t which would be payable. Each step in the 
scheme was car .1 t"  nh genuinely and was exactly what i t  
purported to be. was no binding arrangement th a t  each step
would be followed by the next planned s tep ,  although i t  was
reasonable to assume th a t  the steps would be carr ied  out. The scheme 
was designed to ,  and did, return the taxpayer to the posi t ion which 
he had occupied before i t  began, apart from the obligation to pay
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